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"The Devil May Care"'--Or Should
We? A Re-examination of
Criminal Negligence
By GERHARD 0. W. MUELLER*
Editor's Note: Professor Mueller focuses on the standard of con-
duct to be imposed in cases involving the criminal negligence of
experts or professionals and criticizes the retributive foundations
of traditional theories. He suggests that, in our "world of experts,"
a preventive regulatory approach would be more effective. As for
possible solutions to the problem of criminal negligence, the
author concludes that criminologists must develop new techniques
and methods, such as trial by a tribunal of experts.
The road to hell
is paved with
good intentions.
An anonymous traveler.
I. POSING THE ISSUES-HELL FIRE:
THE COCOANUT GROVE DISASTER2
A little after ten o'clock on tht evening of Saturday,
November 28, 1942, the [Cocoanut Grove] nightclub was
well filled with a crowd of patrons. It was during the busiest
season of the year. An important football game in the after-
noon had attracted many visitors to Boston.... [T] he dance
floor had from eighty to one hundred persons on it and ...
was 'very crowded'. . . . [T]here were from two hundred
fifty to four hundred persons in the Melody Lounge, from
four hundred to five hundred in the main dining room and the
Caricature Bar, and two hundred fifty in the Cocktail Lounge
Professor of Law and Director of Comparative Criminal Law Project, New
York University. This paper, orally presented at the Seventh International Con-
gress of Comparative Law at Uppsala, Sweden, in August, 1966, is specially dedi-
cated to Professor Roy Moreland, friend and revered colleague, and pioneer in
the analysis of the concept of criminal negligence.
1 The expression was used in People v. Brancato, 32 N.Y.S.2d 689, 691 (Sup.
Ct. 1942). See text at note 13 infra.2 Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 55 N.E.2d 902 (1944).
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S. .. There were about seventy tables in the dining room,
each seating from two to eight persons .... all but two were
taken. Many persons were standing in various rooms....
A bartender in the Melody Lounge noticed that an electric
light bulb which was in or near the cocoanut husks of an arti-
ficial palm tree in the comer had been turned off and that the
corner was dark. He directed a sixteen year old bar boy who
was waiting on customers at the tables to cause the bulb to be
lighted. A soldier sitting with other persons near the-light
told the bar boy to leave it unlighted. But the bar boy got a
stool, lighted a match in order to see the bulb, turned the
bulb in its socket, and thus lighted it. The bar boy blew the
match out, and started to walk away. Apparently the flame of
the match had ignited the palm tree and that had speedily
ignited the low cloth ceiling near it, for both flamed up al-
most instantly. The fire spread with great rapidity across the
upper part of the room, causing much heat. The crowd in the
Melody Lounge rushed up the stairs, but the fire preceded
them. People got on fire while on the stairway. The fire spread
with great speed across the foyer and into the Caricature Bar
and the main dining room, and thence into the Cocktail
Lounge. Soon after the fire started the lights in the night club
went out. The smoke had a peculiar odor. The crowd were
panic stricken, and rushed and pushed in every direction
through the night club, screaming, and overturning tables and
chairs in their attempts to escape.3
The emergency doors did not open-they had been kept lock-
ed by the proprietor. 491 people were trampled and burned to
death; the corpses were subsequently found in piles, at locked
doors.
Very few American cases lend themselves as well to an analysis
of the law of criminal negligence as the Cocoanut Grove cases,
both from a factual and a legal point of view. The factual part is
much the more significant; indeed, a proper fact analysis of these
cases may well be dispositive of the issue of negligence in criminal
cases.
To begin with, in rather typical fashion, for many months
preceding the disaster the restaurateur-proprietor of the Cocoa-
nut Grove had permitted an unsafe condition to prevail in his
nightclub. He had, as it were, endangered his patrons. He had
kept them in objective danger of death, though neither they nor
3 Id., 55 N.E.2d at 906-07.
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he were aware of that peril, from all that appears. But should not
a good restaurateur be constantly concerned about the welfare
and safety of his patrons?
Again, in typical fashion, the ensuing disaster brought instant
howls from the public and the authorities, clamoring for the
punishment of the guilty. Consequently, the hapless restaurateur,
Barnett Welansky, was indicted on several dozen counts of in-
voluntary manslaughter and convicted and sentenced on sixteen
counts to as many concurrent prison terms at hard labor, for not
less than twelve nor more than fifteen years, on each count-all
that despite the fact that on the night of the disaster and for
several days therebefore, Welansky had been ill in the hospital.
II. AN ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
The trial judge who had to instruct twelve Bostonians, good
and true, but ignorant of matters legal, faced a formidable task
in explaining the concept of criminal negligence to them. He
began by making it clear that the charges in question were in-
voluntary manslaughter, a crime for which the requisite disap-
provable frame of mind (mens rea, Schuld, element morale)4 is
criminal negligence, rather than an evil intention to kill
(dolus).5 But criminal negligence, in American law, is gross
negligence, culpa lata, which has customarily been described as
wanton or reckless conduct,0 or, to be more particular, intentional
conduct which wantonly or recklessly produces a grave risk of
the prohibited result.7
In the Welansky case the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts said:
The words "wanton" and "reckless" are .. .not merely rhe-
torical or vituperative expressions used instead of negligent
or grossly negligent. They express a difference in the degree
of risk and in the voluntary taking of risk so marked, as
4For an analysis of mens rea see Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea, 42
MIN. L. REV. 1043 (1958).
0 For an analysis of dolus see 1 Btmnicmc, Crmm 123-24 (1946).
o For an analysis of recklessness in homicide see Mueller, Where Murder Be-
gins, 2 N.H.B.J. 214 (1960).
7 Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 55 N.E.2d 902, 909-10 (1944).
Indeed, every instance of what legally amounts to negligence, and which is often
referred to as negligent behavior, is first of all, conduct, i.e., rational, goal-directed
action. See MORELAND, A RATIONALE OF CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE 32 (1944).
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compared with negligence, as to amount substantially and in
the eyes of the law to a difference in kind.8
This type of a definition raises some very troublesome issues-
troublesome to the scholar, that is, though perhaps not so trouble-
some to the somewhat more naive ordinary layman who has been
placed in judgment as a juror.
A. The Degree of Risk
Quite correctly the instruction circumscribes that high degree
of criminal negligence which deserves the appellation "wanton or
reckless" in terms of "grave danger to others." This makes it clear
that on a purely objective plane, there is an appreciable difference
between ordinary negligence, which suffices for civil liability, and
gross negligence, or recklessness, which must be proven for cri-
minal liability-whenever criminal negligence is the established
mens rea for criminal liability. That, of course, is plainly the case
under the definition of crimes like involuntary manslaughter. In
his treatise, A Rationale of Criminal Negligence, Moreland ob-
served properly that "The risk which such conduct entails must
be greater for criminal liability than is required for civil."0 Any
attempted explanatibn of the degree of negligence would be in
vain. There is no thermometer of negligence, and no compass can
measure its degrees. The difference between the criminal and the
civil measure of negligence is that between an undifferentiated
plus and minus.
B. Risk Detection: Objectivity vs. Subjectivity
The grave danger must be apparent. Presumably, if it is not
apparent, no criminal liability can ever result. But must it have
been apparent to the detached observer as well as the defendant
himself? The judge in Welansky said that an activity amounts to
wanton or reckless conduct "if the grave danger was in fact
realized by the defendant ... no matter whether the ordinary man
would have realized the gravity of the danger or not."' 0 That
much has certainly been established law in the United States, for
8 55 N.E.2d 902, 910.
9 MORELAND, op. cit. supra note 7, at 41-42.
10 55 N.E.2d 902, 910.
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no proposition seemed more firmly entrenched than that criminal
negligence, or recklessness, of the conscious variety will lead to
criminal liability. But a split of opinion prevails as regards that
degree of criminal negligence which, while apparent as such to
the ordinarily prudent man in the defendant's position, was not
recognized as such by the defendant himself. According to one
line of authority, "at common law there is no criminal liability
for harm thus caused by inadvertence."" "Criminal negligence
necessarily implies, not only knowledge of probable consequences
which may result from the use of a given instrumentality, but
also willful or wanton disregard of the probable effects of such
instrumentality upon others likely to be affected thereby.'
2
Summing up American law in point, the colorful New York
Criminal Court judge, Samuel Leibowitz, gave the following
explanation:
Criminal negligence is synonymous with culpable negligence.
Such negligence encompasses a reckless and wanton disregard
for the safety of life and limb. It is not sufficient to establish
merely ordinary negligence. The law requires more than that.
The facts and circumstances . . . must indicate such a reck-
lessness and wanton devil may care attitude on the part of
the accused as to evince a contemptuous disregard for con-
sequence to life and limb of others. In sum, the evidence must
disclose what would almost be tantamount to a wilfulness
to do harm.13
American teachers of law, or for that matter American lawyers
in general, are prone to assert broadly that for criminal liability,
the criminal negligence must be of the conscious variety. Indeed,
if it is a common law proposition that a mens rea is required for
each crime-and it is- 14 and if it is a common law proposition
that mens rea requires awareness of the possible harm and a de-
cision to create (or risk creating) that harm neverthless-and that
is indeed a common law proposition-' 5 it must surely follow that
no negligence or recklessness of the unconscious variety can suf-
fice for criminal liability in the United States. This is, essentially,
1 1 TuRNERn, KEaNY's OuTLws OF CmizNAL LAw 34 (18th ed. 1962).
12 Thomas v. State, 91 Ga. App. 382, 884, 85 S.E.2d 644, 645-46 (1955).
13 People v. Brancato, 32 N.Y.S.2d 689, 691 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
14 Mueller, supra note 4.
'G Ibid.
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Jerome Hall's conclusion," and several other American scholars
would agree. If pressed for elucidation and explanation, most
American courts would have to reach the same conclusion. But
they have generally avoided committing themselves about the
precise standard. Sears and Weihofen wrote: "In dealing with
negligence many decisions can be explained satisfactorily only on
the basis of an objective standard. But the courts generally refuse
to accept fully the logic of their position."' 7
An easy way out of the dilemma is an emphasis on the
evidentiary significance of the facts. Hall wrote:
[T] he jury . . . must find that his conduct fell below the
standard of "due care" and that the defendant knew he was
increasing the risk of harm; and ... they are warranted in so
finding if they find that a reasonable man in the given situa-
tion would have been aware of it.'
Honig criticized Hall for expressing this frequently resorted
to procedural device of solving the otherwise well-nigh impossible
task of fathoming a defendant's past deep psychic recesses: "that
awareness becomes fictitious if it can be presumed and imputed
to the defendant, subject to the application of the reasonable man
standard."' 9
It is indeed important to differentiate between the fact of
conscious recklessness, on the one hand, and proof of that fact
on the other. If a perpetrator has acted with recklessness, objec-
tively judged, it is one thing to say: "we do not believe you if you
tell us you were not conscious of the possible detrimental conse-
quences as they in fact subsequently occurred." It is another thing
to say: "we can convict you of the crime, i.e., we shall impute gross
recklessness to you, even absent any proof of your consciousness of
the possible consequences."
Few American courts have been able to appreciate this dis-
tinction between fact and evidence regarding recklessness, though
many courts have unconsciously or intuitively sought refuge in
this evidentiary method of solving the dilemma, with the con-
16 HALL, CRm, NAL LAw ch. 4 (2d ed. 1960); Hafl, Negligent Behavior
Should Be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63 COL. L. REv. 632 (1963).
17 SEAS & WE-HOFEN, MAY'S CmMiNAL LAW 26 (4th ed. 1938).
1 8 HALL, CRIMINAL LAW 121 (2d ed. 1960).
19 Honig, Criminal Law Systematized, 54 J. Qums. L., C. & P.S. 273, 281(1963).
[Vol. 55,
THE DEVIL MAY CARE
sequence that, over the years, there have been more and more
compromises with the ancient requirement of mens rea as con-
scious awareness.
The Cocoanut Grove disaster case demonstrates the point.
There the trial court instructed the jury:
[E]ven if a particular defendant is so stupid [or] so
heedless * * * that in fact he did not realize the grave
danger, he cannot escape the imputation of wanton or reck-
less conduct in his dangerous act or omission, if an ordinary
normal man under the same circumstances would have
realized the gravity of the danger. A man may be reckless
within the meaning of the law although he himself thought
he was careful.20
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts approved this
jury instruction, and its inherent switch from conscious to un-
conscious recklessness has been endorsed by several American
scholars. Professor Moreland employed the standard of uncon-
scious criminal negligence in his model jury instructions..2 1
Professor Perkins specifically approved of the test developed by
the Massachusetts court in its Cocoanut Grove decision.2
C. Contemporary American Legislative Indecision
Regarding Criminal Negligence
Contemporary American legislation has not freed itself from
the indecisive attitude of case law in regard to the objectivity
or subjectivity of standards. On the one hand modern American
codes document the existence of an objective criminal negligence;
on the other hand they are extremely reluctant to base any
liability on the objective form of negligence. Thus, section 3 of
the current New York Penal Law2 3 presents a definition of
criminal negligence in objective terms, as importing "a want of
such attention to the nature or probable consequences of the act
or omission as a prudent man ordinarily bestows in acting in his
own concerns."2 4 But the body of the very same code does not
define any offenses for which such unconscious negligence is a
20 Commonvealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 883, 55 N.E.2d 902, 910 (1944).
21 MORELAND, op. cit. supra note 7, at 141-47.
22 PEIUNs, C~amnNAL LAW 667 (1957).
23 This section is about to be replaced by the N. Y. PENAL LAW oF 1967.
24 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 3 (1881).
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sufficient degree of culpability, recklessness or culpable negligence
being usually required.2 5 The several other states which in their
own penal legislation have adopted the New York formula like-
wise do not seem to actually punish one who acted with mere
unconscious negligence. 26
This state of affairs, as it were, has recently been codified by
the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute. It recog-
nizes both conscious recklessness and unconscious negligence as
forms of culpability, but applies unconscious negligence only in
a few isolated cases.
In the Model Penal Code recklessness is defined in terms of
conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk.27 As to
unconscious negligence the Code provides: "A person acts negli-
gently with respect to a material element of an offense when he
should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk....
But this standard of unconscious negligence is then employed only
in three situations:
(1) There is a crime of negligent homicide, for which, under
the Model Penal Code, unconscious negligence suffices. 29
This is a felony of the third degree, for which the ordi-
nary punishment is not in excess of five years imprison-
ment.30
(2) A new crime of negligent assault by the negligent
causing of bodily injury to another with a deadly
weapon, has been created.3' This crime is a misde-
meanor, the ordinary maximum punishment for which
is one year imprisonment.
(3) A new type of criminal mischief has been recognized.
It consists, among others, of the damaging of the tangi-
ble property of another by negligence in the employment
of fire or explosives.3 2
The recently adopted Illinois Penal Code has adopted the
general definition of unconscious negligence, but has not used the
25N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1053-a (1936) (criminal negligence in operation of
vehicle resulting in death).
26 See MODEL PENAL CODE, comment pp. 127-28 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
27 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
28 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(d) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
29 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.4 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
30 MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.06(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
31 MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(1) (B) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
32 MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3 (1) (a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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concept in the special part.33 Similarly the New York Penal Law
(Code), which is to take effect in 1967, embraced the Model
Penal Code's conception of unconscious negligence, in terms of
failure to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk.34 But here,
too, the actual use of unconscious negligence is minimal. As in
the Model Penal Code, it is to be found in the crime of criminally
negligent homicide," ', as well as in third degree assault.3 1"
It can be concluded that, at last, the concept of unconscious
criminal negligence has been officially recognized in American
criminal law, though its use is, as yet, very minimal. The Cocoa-
nut Grove decision, which approved of unconscious negligence,
was merely a forerunner in the use of this concept.
D. The Purpose of Imposing Criminal Liability
for Unconscious Negligence
Arguments in support of unconscious criminal negligence are
extremely sparse, both in decisional law and in the writings of the
scholars. The draftsmen of the Model Penal Code simply argued
as follows:
Knowledge that conviction and sentence, not to speak of
punishment, may follow conduct that inadvertently creates
improper risk supplies men with an additional notice to take
care before acting, to use their faculties and draw on their
experience in gauging the potentialities of contemplated con-
duct. To some extent, at least, this notice may promote
awareness and thus be effective as a measure of control. 37
Unfortunately, the statement is not supported by any reference
to either legal or behavioral study in point. Whether this state-
ment is supported even in terms of basic principles of psychology
is debatable; however, the belief in the validity of the assumption
may have some sort of a positive effect. Continental writers
generally have supported criminal liability for unconscious
negligence by the same reasoning sometimes referring to it as the
"alarm clock function." Some day it might be possible to con-
duct a psychological experiment for testing the effect of potential
33 ILL. PENAL CODE §§ 4-7.
.4 N. Y. PENAL LAW OF 1967 § 15.05(4).
35 N. Y. PENAL LAW OF 1967 § 125.10.
:" N. Y. PENAL LAW OF 1967 § 120.00.
37 MODEL PENAL CODE pp. 126-27 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
19661
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
objective negligence liability on the psyche of an unaware actor.
For the time being, one can only guess. The long-range, educa-
tional effect, viz., the general-preventive effect, of this type of
liability may well be more easily demonstrable than the short-
term specially-preventive effect on the particular action of a
particular actor.
The crime-preventive efficacy of unconscious negligence liabi-
lity has been roundly denied by Professor Hall, who says: "[T] he
legal apparatus cannot assure such a close association between
negligence and pain as to provide any support for the use of
punishment on this ground. ' '38 Insofar as the specially-deterrent
(or preventive) policy of the law is concerned, Hall is probably
on fairly safe ground, but it may well be otherwise in regard to
the long-range educational value of the penal law. We must re-
member that criminal law is also-and perhaps prominently-an
instrument useful in creating, preserving and protecting socially
desirable attitudes. The negligent person probably is an ethically
insensitive person and is, thus, possessed of a socially disapprovable
attitude, frame of mind, or character. Cannot the law, by ex-
pressing criminal disapproval of that attitude, discourage its con-
tinued existence? "[T] he causes of negligence may be so deeply
rooted in the personality structure of the inadvertent harm-doer
as to require a great deal of punishment to alter his habits-as-
suming that punishment has any such effect," writes Hall.39
Whether punishment has to be greater the more deep-seated
the basic cause for the commission of prohibited acts is a matter
on which we have no research data. Consequently, the issue which
can be reasonably debated at this point is solely the question of
whether on psychological and ethical grounds any punishment of
a person who has not resolved to do wrong is proper and desirable.
To put the question differently, we must ask ourselves whether an
evil may be inflicted with good correctional motives and in
justifiable expectation of socially desirable results, when the
object of the infliction is "dangerous" but not "bad." Hall and
the American traditionalists would draw the line before this limit
and would refuse to use the criminal sanction in such a case. They
would be perfectly willing, however, to embrace the broader
38 HALL, op. cit. supra note 18, at 138-39.
39 Id. at 139.
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policies of social defense40 by using all kinds of restraints-short
of criminal sanctions-upon the dangerous, but not bad, negligent
actor.41
The issue I have just sketched is a highly theoretical one for
four reasons: (I) The courts have not concerned themselves with
it and have acted purely on intuition. Thus, the theoretical
argument is at best de lege ferenda, but not de lege lata. (2) The
arguments are entirely devoid of any factual, i.e., behavioral
science, data, one way or the other. (3) In the final analysis, the
debaters would probably agree to the extent that each would
employ measures against the dangerous negligent actor, felt to be
detrimental by him, except that one school would call these mea-
sures punishments, and the other would call them measures of
social defense. (4) Every indication I have is to the effect that
when our American courts violated the principle of mens rea and
imposed criminal liability for unconscious negligence, they did so
for purely retributive reasons. After each disaster or calamity, the
public clamors for the punishment of those "responsible." In a
democracy of common law traditions, the courts are highly sensi-
tive to such public demands and, under public pressure, are more
likely to pay attention to public demands than to the niceties of
theory and tradition. The Cocoanut Grove case demonstrates the
point vividly: 491 victims were clamoring for retaliation; this re-
taliation found its expression in the retributive punishment of one
of only a handful of persons who could possibly be blamed for any-
thing-anything at all- even if only carelessness of which they
themselves may not have been aware.42
Thus, when we argue about the theoretical foundations of
unconscious criminal negligence, we should keep in mind that,
more than anything else, it has been and is one instance of the
most ancient and perhaps most discredited classical penal aims of
all: retribution. Whether, as such, it should have a place in the
penal-correctional policy of the late twentieth century is a point
much more worthy of debate than is any of the other suggested
justifications for its use.
40 For an introduction to the general theories of social defense see ANCEL,
SOCIAL DEFENCE (1966).
41 HALL, Op. cit. supra note 18, at 139.
42 Compare MORELAND, Op. cit. supra note 7, at 52.
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III. LEGAL ALTERNATIVES TO CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
A. The Regulatory Offense
If, in the past and to this day American criminal law theory
has operated virtually without a concept of unconscious criminal
negligence, what other forces did the law employ in fact to
enforce public compliance with a myriad of statutory regulations
enacted to protect against the hazards of life in a modern in-
dustrialized society? This question contains a part of its own
answer. Rather than to punish citizens for criminal harms pro-
duced through unconscious negligence, e.g., human death, the
legislatures of the United States have sought to prevent cer-
tain underlying dangerous activities capable of producing greater
harm. By way of example, in lieu of a policy of punishing
pharmacists for negligent homicide arising out of certain risky
drug concoctions, the law favors a policy of prohibiting or regu-
lating those drug concoctions. One could call this approach the
"preventive law" approach. But now the question arises: what
standard of mens rea is to be applied for punishing those who have
violated the regulatory statute? Criminal intent? Recklessness?
Unconscious criminal negligence? Or what? The American law
has answered this question in the most paradoxical fashion pos-
sible. Unconscious criminal negligence was generally regarded as
too immoral, too unethical a standard. Blame; so it was thought,
should not attach where action was not accompanied by a con-
sciously blameworthy attitude toward the protected interest in
question. Yet, that very same moralistic law accepted without
question a morally much less acceptable solution: liability with-
out any fault whatsoever.43
The Cocoanut Grove disaster may again serve as an illustra-
tion. A Massachusetts statute requires that all construction changes
in certain buildings may be made only with a governmental per-
mit, in accordance with approved drawings, and providing for fire-
doors. After the disaster it turned out that W¥elansky, the owner
of the Cocoanut Grove, had hired a builder (Rudnick) to make
alterations. Rudnick acted in violation of the statute. Since the
greater the harm, the greater the'demand for scapegoats, Rudnick
43 See Mueller, Mens Rea and the Law Without It, 58 W. Va. L. REv. 34(1955).
[Vol. 55,
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was indicted. Had the indictment been for a straight violation of
the alteration statute, he could unquestionably have been convict-
ed without any proof that he was aware of wrongdoing. In many
states, statutoyy violations of the regulatory type carry penalties
regardless of mens rea, i.e., it is not necessary for the prosecution
to prove dolhts (the intention to commit a wrong) or even criminal
recklessness. The mere doing of the act-whether known to be
wrong or not-suffices. Unfortunately, American legislatures, if
they cannot deal with any regulatory problem in an urbane, civil,
administrative manner, frequently resort to the device of absolute
liability (usually in the nature of malum prohibitum) as last re-
sort. The defendant is convicted-since proof of guilt is not re-
quired-and that ends the matter. But in the Cocoanut Grove dis-
aster case the government was more ambitious. The prosecution
was ambitious enough to prosecute Rudnick for a conspiracy to
violate the alteration statute, rather than for a simple violation.
This charge required proof of an agreement on the part of
Rudnick with another (Welansky) to violate the statute in
question. While a conspiracy charge has many procedural ad-
vantages over a prosecution for the substantive crime in question,44
it also has one singular disadvantage: the prosecution must prove
criminal guilt, i.e., mens rea. "The indictment being for con-
spiracy to commit an offense which is malum prohibitum only,
there must have been an intent to do wrong . . . and knowledge
of the existence of the law and knowledge of its actual or intended
violation."4 And how can one prove such an evil intent, and such
a knowledge? The Massachusetts court said:
[T]he jury could have inferred that the defendant.. . and
Welansky . . . were aware of the statute and by concerted
action planned its violation. The Commonwealth did not have
to prove that either knew the number of the chapter or the
year of its passage. It is enough if they knew that a law re-
quired an approved plan for alterations to which they had
to conform but with which by united action they did not
comply. The defendant was a builder of many years" ex-
perience. He knew that the law required permits for the
alterations, and that he "had to go according to the plan."40
44 See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), especially the dis-
senting opinion of Rutledge, J.
45 Commonwealth v. Rudnick, 318 Mass. 45, 60 N.E.2d 353 (1945).
40 Id., 60 N.E.2d at 357.
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It seems we have gone full circle and once again reached the
point at which the proof of an attitude is at stake. Should we
be objective and convict when a reasonably prudent builder would
have known of the existence of the regulation (whether the de-
fendant did or not), or should we insist on proof that this builder
knew of the regulation and intended to violate it? The former
would amount to a violation of tradition and would be obnoxious
on moral grounds. The latter is a virtual impossibility. The court
chose a middle ground, by again making the question a purely
evidentiary one, which answers itself rhetorically: "The defendant
was a builder of many years' experience." How could he believably
argue-if he were to do that-that he did not know of the existence
of the regulation? Would it not be laughable for him to say that
he was unaware of the regulation? Hence, he must have known of
the regulation. "He knew that the law required permits for the
alterations and that he 'had to go according to the plan.' ,,47 And
thus, the public had another scapegoat for its disaster.
Disasters aside, regulatory legislation is unquestionably the
single most significant alternative to the imposition of uncon-
scious negligence liability. And if such regulatory legislation
operates sensibly in the general framework of human experience
and human expectation, it is surely contributing more to the
prevention of disaster than any unconscious negligence liability.
Unfortunately, by operating with criminal liability without fault,
much of our regulatory legislation presents a fruitless effort at
social engineering.48
B. Licensing Provisions
Prominent among regulatory statutes-each one governing a
different profession, activity, or calling-are the licensing statutes.
Certain potentially dangerous activities may be carried out only
under license. They range anywhere from operating a motor
vehicle to selling real estate, from performing in a nightclub to
performing brain surgery, from selling shoelaces door to door to
carrying a firearm. Again, there is no empirical evidence what-
soever in the United States which would attest to the social use-
47 Ibid.
48Mueller, Equal Injustice Under Law, Challenge-The Magazine of Eco-
nomic Affairs, Oct. 1961, pp. 6-8.
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tulness of these licensing statutes, though it can hardly be subject
to doubt that most have some socially useful effect. That others
have deteriorated into patronage prerogatives or revenue measures
is hardly open to doubt.
To the extent that the internal regulation and supervision
of a profession is left to an internal disciplinary machinery, the
problems of harm through a lack of skill in the exercise of a pro-
fession are likely to be removed from the public eye. The extent
to which the problems themselves are actually minimized is
completely unknown. Thus, if the American medical profession
enjoys a high prestige, for the exercise of medical skill and the
prevention of negligence, it is entirely uncertain whether this may
be due to: (1) a high degree of professional skill as a result of
excellent training; (2) prevention of dangerous operations by
negligent doctors, through internal policing of the profession; or
(3) professional-organizational success in internally suppressing
publicity of negligence by American physicians. Few would doubt
that the key probably lies in an excellent standard of training,
cultivation of high skills prior to licensing for practice, and
strict examination standards for licensing.
If experience with the training and licensing of American
motorists can serve as any clue to the problem, the key to suc-
cess does indeed lie in training, even more than in licensing,
since standards for the licensing of drivers are generally lax. But
training for driving, in the sense which includes the conditiqning
of the future driver for command of an automobile, is very in-
tense in the United States, as compared with the rest of the world.
An American youngster grows up with the automobile, and he
even goes to school with an automobile. Here, rather than in the
difference of laws regarding criminal negligence, may lie the
reason that the American automobile death toll amounts to only
a quarter of that of the most motorized European countries. 49
IV. PROFESSION AND EXPERIENCE
We should now focus on the judge of the facts, be he one of
twelve laymen-jurors, or a professional judge, who is confronted
49 Mueller, Criminal Law and Procedure in the Field of Highway Traffic
(paper submitted to the Sixth International Congress of Comparative Law, Ham-
burg, Germany, 1962).
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with the task of fathoming the past frame of mind of a defendant
charged with having produced a criminal harm through [conscious]
criminal negligence. The task is not a difficult one. By the very
nature of things, criminal negligence entails the violation of a
legally imposed duty or expected standard of care. The aggregate
of legal duties in a given society may theoretically befall all mem-
bers thereof, but it does so unequally. All drivers are subject to
one set of duties; all architects, to another; all dog-owners, to
another; and all members of voluntary fire departments, to still
another. It is entirely conceivable that one citizen is subject to
all of these duties, if he is a dog-owning architect with a driver's
license and a membership in the voluntary fire department. How-
ever, it is unlikely that in any given activity, or at any given
moment, he is subject to more than one specialized bundle of
duties to care, or responsibilities of awareness.
American law, generally, requires the judge of the fact to
judge by "the standard of care expected to be maintained by a
reasonably careful man under like circunstances." 50 Surely the
most significant circumstance is the defendant's calling, profes-
sion, trade, occupation or, indeed, hobby, if that is at all relevant
to the offense charged. Professor Moreland singled out the phy-
sician or surgeon, whom we encounter more frequently than any
other professional in the law of criminal negligence, in demon-
strating the significance of referring to the particular professional
skill of the defendant: "Physicians and surgeons are not judged
by the standard of the ordinary prudent man. Their special train-
ing and experience qualify them as persons who, in their fields,
possess a type of judgment and knowledge so superior.., that the
law is justified in creating a separate standard to be used in
judging their professional acts."5' 1 This, indeed, is true of pro-
fessions of any sort-only, however, as regards acts related to their
profession. While Professor Moreland did, unfortunately, use an
objective standard, he was careful to point out that even a profes-
sional could be held only to standards of an ordinary profes-
sional practicing in the same or similar locality as the defendant. -5 2
50o MODEL PENAL CODE, comment p. 127 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
51 MORELAND, op. cit. supra note 7, at 80.
52 Id. at 82.
[Vol. 55.
TBE DEVIL MAY CARE
This amounts to a specification and individualization of objectivity
which approaches subjectivity very nearly.
It is rare for any criminal court to be confronted with a charge
of any crime requiring negligence which does not require reference
to a very special skill or to a set of propositions governing a dis-
tinct calling. Most frequently, nowadays, the skill in question
pertains to the operation of motor vehicles. Here, as in nearly all
other crimes of criminal negligence, the standard has not yet be-
come one of unconscious negligence, or at least not fully. The
standard of culpability for motor vehicle offenses still is largely one
of recklessness, requiring proof of consciousness of the risk which
led to the harm. But in these prosecutions the ideal has been
achieved: the court (or jury) is composed of fellow specialists
who-while trying to fathom the defendant's past frame of mind-
will obviously refer to their own experience when it comes to
imputing conscious recklessness to the defendant. In many other
types of cases it may become necessary to let the jury listen to the
expert opinion of a fellow specialist of the defendant's, in order
to ascertain what a professional of the defendant's calling would
have done under the circumstances, so as to ascertain what the
defendant probably did contemplate at the time of the critical
action.
English judges have been swift to conclude that the requisite
[conscious?] criminal negligence was constituted when the harm-
ful consequence was due to an act or omission of the defendant's
which seemed obviously improper. Thus, where a workman in a
mine is charged with the duty of putting a stage over the mouth
of the shaft, and the omission so to do causes the death of a
human being, he is guilty of homicide.5 3 So where a person charged
with the duty of hoisting persons from a mine leaves the engine
in charge of a boy known to be incompetent,54 or a railroad em-
ployee neglects to flag a train,55 or put on brakes,56 or turn a
switch,57 he is responsible for the injuries resulting therefrom.58
S3 Regina v. Hughes, 7 Cox Crim. Cas. 286 (1857).
54 Regina v. Lowe, 3 C. & K. 129 (1850).
55 Rex v. Pargeter, 8 Cox Crim. Cas. 191 (1848).30 Regina v. Elliott, 16 Cox Crim. Cas. 710 (1889).
57 State v. O'Brian, 82 N.J.L. 169 (1867).
• -S SEARS & WEMOFEN, MAY'S CRIMINAL LA-w 24-25 (4th ed. 1988).
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American law has created a few offenses that can be com-
mitted only by narrowly-defined groups of specialists of one type
or another. By way of example, the existing New York Penal Law
knows a group of involuntary manslaughter (second degree) of-
fenses, committable, among others, through negligence on the
part of hunters, 9 of machine operators, seamen, steamboat cap-
tains and engineers, and physicians,60 as well as gunpowder manu-
facturers and animal keepers. 61 There have been few convictions
under these statutory provisions, but nearly all of these make it
clear that the criminal negligence required was of the conscious
type,02 ordinarily ascertained by reference to prudent professional
action under like circumstances. 3
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
IN A WORLD OF EXPERTS
For Germany, Jescheck has concluded properly that the
morphology of action through criminal negligence, as a problem
of criminal theory, has been brought nearer to a solution in re-
cent years, while per contra, as a criminological problem, a solu-
tion is as yet far distant. 64 Particularly important is the discovery
of German theoreticians that criminal negligence is to be regarded
as a criterion of both the unlawfulness of an action-thus, as an
objective ingredient of the crime concept-and as a criterion of
the mens rea, and thus as a subjective element of the crime
concept.65
American law has had no difficulty with the first character-
istic of criminal negligence, namely that of an objectively unlawful
action-however difficult it may be in an individual case to decide
whether a defendant's action has exceeded the bounds of the
permissible. But American law has had difficulty in regarding
59 N. Y. PENAL LAw § 1053-c (1958).
60 N. Y. PENAL LAW §§ 1052, 1053-e (1953).
61 N. Y. PENAL LAW §§ 1052, 1053-e (1953). But in this case the statute
seems to impose absolute liability whenever there was the slightest violation of
regulatory statutes in the case of the gunpowder manufacturer, or the slightest
knowledge of the animal's ferociousness in the case of the animal keeper. See
People v. Sandgren, 302 N.Y. 331, 98 N.E.2d 460 (1951).
62 See People v. Joseph, 11 Misc. 2d 219, 172 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
63People v. Clemente, 146 App. Div. 109, 130 N.Y. Supp. 612 (1911),
af'd mem., 207 N.Y. 682, 101 N.E. 1114 (1913).
64 JEscHEcK, AUFBAuT UND BEHANDLUNG DER FAERLASSIG REIT Ia MODERNEN
STAFREcHT 7 (Freiburger Universititrsreden, Neue Folge, Heft 39, 1965).
65 Id. at 8 et seq.
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criminal negligence as a form or a type of mens rea. Much more
than in continental law, the "moral element," or "guilt element"
of a crime, at common law, is understood to be personal conscious
wrongdoing or, as stated by this author elsewhere: "Precisely
speaking, guilt is not merely objective attribution, but, rather,
is a societal finding of a frame of mind, or an attitude, with which
the perpetrator created the criminal harm. As such it is not the
mere psychic relation between act and actor-participation of con-
scious psychic forces in the interdicted conduct-but rather it is
the awareness, existing at the time of the act and going into its
very composition, that the act contravenes the law or expectations
of the community. Guilt, or mens rea, then, is the known or felt
ethico-legal negative value known to the perpetrator at the time
of the deed. To this must be added the perpetrator's wish and
decision to act nevertheless."' ' ;
Consequently, in American law unconsciously negligent action
may well be unlawful, but it is not criminal, for want of a
mens rea, while consciously negligent (reckless) action is both un-
lawful and guilty action. The maxim that unconsciously negligent
action should not lead to criminal liability has been breached only
when severe disasters did retroactively arouse the public clamor for
revenge and retribution. The criminal liability of unconscious
negligence, however, should not be justified solely by catering to
such primeval psychic forces which, hopefully, our society is
shedding in turning to a more modern, prevention-oriented law.
Nevertheless, we have noted that the trend of American law is
probably toward a greater objectification of the standard of crimi-
nal negligence, thus, a trend from criminal negligence as a
criterion of guilt to one of criminal negligence as a criterion of
unlawfulness. G7
This development is the result of permitting the jurors to re-
fer to their own-or a reasonable man's-life experience when
determining what must have been going on in the defendant's
mind.6s But there have been few outright commitments by Ameri-
" Mueller, The Public Law of Wrongs, 10 J. PUB. L. 203, 237 (1961).
07 In this connection see also Perkins, Alignment of Sanction with Culpable
Conduct, 49 IOWA L. REv. 325, 360 (1964).
68 Several colleagues of the Benelux countries have likewise recognized the
problem of unconscious criminal negligence to be primarily an evidentiary one.
See CORNIL, DIE FAHRLASSIGKEIT IM FRANZOSISCH-BELGISC-EN REc-T, 1962 Z.F.
RECHTSVERCLEICHUNG 30, 37 (1965).
19661
KENTucKY LAW JO RNAL
can courts-though there have been some by legislatures-accepting
unconscious or inadvertent negligence directly as a basis of
liability.
This development does not solve the problem. Nor is the
problem one which can be solved by criminal law theory. It
ultimately is of no consequence whether, from a theoretical point
of view, one were to expand the concept of mens rea so as to in-
clude unconscious negligence within its scope, or whether one
were to admit of the punishability of offenders who have caused
criminal harm through criminal negligence absent mens rea. Nor
is it possible to decide at this point whether the problem of harm
caused by inadvertently negligent persons is a problem of the
criminal law. We know that it is a social problem. We do not
know whether the traditional sanctions of the criminal law can
reduce the number of harms produced through inadvertent negli-
gence. But we would seem to be justified in taking every decently
acceptable prophylactic and incapacitative measure to isolate
potential or proven human danger sources. If we want criminal
law to be understood in this broadest possible sense of danger-
preventive law, which sometimes operates with punishments meant
to hurt 69 and at other times with preventive measures not meant
to hurt,70 then the problem of inadvertent negligence is properly
a question which belongs before a criminal court.
However, it is not going to be easy for the traditional criminal
court, composed of judge and jury, to decide those cases which
will call for superior knowledge of a multitude of technical
specialties, except in traffic cases in which virtually every American
claims expertise. Perhaps a new type of tribunal is called for, a
tribunal to consist of the defendant's fellow professionals, fellow
experts, a tribunal of quasi-official, quasi-administrative character,
existing within the defendant's profession and outside the ambit
of the regular criminal courts. We should, perhaps, permit our
experts at least to run themselves-reluctant though we are to
permit them to run our world. But whether we like it or not, we
do have a world run by experts-though it may not always seem
that way. In any event, we are at the mercy of experts, and in this
world of specialized skills every fellow human being is an expert
69 This is probably true only when mens rea is established.
70 This is true regardless of the presence of a mens rea in the traditional sense.
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of some sort on whose skill we all depend, or whose lack of skill
may spell disaster for many. Space catastrophies may be caused by
the slightest sloppiness of an insignificant electrician. Nuclear
catastrophy could be triggered by the want of care of a plumber.
Are we at the mercy of each other's expertise? Are we to be run
by experts, or are we to run the experts? The evasive, yet correct,
answer to this real question is, of course, that we are permitting
the experts to run us, but that we force them to stay within certain
limits. We have drawn boundaries, and if an expert oversteps
them, we subject him to the penalties of a myriad of regulatory
laws. But our present laws have gone a step beyond that, by
threatening to impose penalties on experts who nolens-volens have
inflicted harm. Let us not forget, however, that, when inflicting
this type of a punishment, we are acting out of ancient retributive
feelings. We are not engaged in wise social engineering-at least,
we lack scientific evidence to that effect. Our law governing the
protection of society against the negligence of experts urgently
needs reexamination and experimentation. Ancient concepts, ac-
cepted only because of their antiquity, may no longer be good
enough when disasters lurk around all corners and may flow from
the hands of good-hearted and kindly fellow human beings. To-
day's criminally negligent offender is not the same human being
against whom the classical concepts and the classical sanctions of
traditional criminal law have been created. For criminalists to
postpone studies and reform of this problem of criminal negligence
of professionals, does indeed amount to professional criminal
negligence. It is we who can open or close the emergency doors to
purgatory on earth.
1966]
